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A history of hysteria can not be cut off from the history of psychoanalysis, and it is true vice 
versa.  Nevertheless, it seems that hysteria has disappeared while psychoanalysis, as we see, 
is still here.  To be sure, the history of both are burdened with crises, regarding their names 
and referents as well. It has always been problematic to define the concept of hysteria, and, 
besides the disappearance of the typical “grande hystérie,” this is another reason why the 
often pejorative term “hysteria” was replaced by the more neutral, though at the same time 
more elegant term of “conversion reaction.”  At the same time, the opposite seems to have 
happened to the concept of psychoanalysis, for the preservation of the clearness of the term, 
it has had to go through a series of splittings. The thus emerging new and distinct 
phenomena were named as individual psychology, analytical psychology, for instance, or, 
as in the case of Rank, Ferenczi or Groddeck, they were pushed to the periphery of the 
theory. I will suggest, that the history of neither hysteria, nor psychoanalysis would have 
been formed in this fashion without the interactions between the theory and the organization 
of a certain man and between certain symptoms of an organism.
Psychoanalysis and Freud owe their careers to hysteria, hysteria – according to 
psychoanalysis – owes its disappearance to psychoanalysis in two senses.  First, explaining 
the etiology of hysteria, the mechanism of repression, psychoanalysis contributed to the 
termination of the causes, and so it contributed to a kind of sexual liberation.  Second, the 
psychoanalytical treatment can overcome concrete cases of hysteria by detecting and 
making conscious its causes.  This second success is in a bizarre relation with Freud’s doubt 
concerning the usefulness of the psychoanalytical treatment, but, in any case, hysteria 
nowadays is not a central problem either in psychoanalysis, or in psychiatry in general.  In 
l931 Ferenczi wrote the following:
It seems, indeed, that nerve specialists are right in saying that in our day it is becoming much 
more rare for people to produce obvious hysterias such as, only a few decades ago, were 
described as comparatively widespread.  It seems as if, with the advance of civilization, even 
the neuroses have become more civilized and adult.  But I believe that, if we are sufficiently 
patient and persevering, even firmly consolidated, purely intrapsychic mechanisms can be 
demolished and reduced to the level of the infantile trauma (Ferenczi 1950d [1931]: 141).
Our question is whether hysteria has disappeared, and if that is so, then where is it now? 
I strive to look for my answer in the wake of Sándor Ferenczi’s conception of hysteria, 
whose own answer and theory is unique in the realm of psychoanalysis.
Where Have You Gone, Hysteria?
György Péter Hárs
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Puppetry with a Latent Director
Before turning to theory, let us read a case of hysteria by Ferenczi:
A young man of twenty-two came to me with the complaint that he was ‘very nervous’ and 
suffered from terrifying dream-hallucinations.  It then appeared that he was married, but 
‘because he is so frightened at night’ was not sleeping with his wife but in the next room on the 
floor beside his mother’s bed.  The nightmare, whose return had alarmed him for the last seven 
or eight months, and which he could not relate without horror, ran the first time as follows: ‘I 
wakened,’ he said, ‘about one o’clock in the night, had to clutch my neck with my hand and 
shouted: there is a mouse on me, it is running into my mouth.  My mother woke, lit a light, 
petted and soothed me.  I could not, however, go to sleep till my mother took me in her bed. 
[…] When my mother struck a light I saw that instead of the much-feared mouse I had my own 
left hand in my mouth, and I was endeavouring with all my strength to pull it out with my right 
hand.’  It thus became clear that in this dream the left hand played a peculiar part, the part of a 
mouse; he wanted to catch or chase away with his right hand, this hand that felt around at his 
neck, but the ‘mouse’ ran into his open mouth and threatened to suffocate him.  […] It must be 
emphasized that the patient had already wakened and shouted in a suffocated voice for light, but 
that his left hand was still sticking in his mouth without his being able to distinguish it from a 
mouse.  […] Even a superficial examination of this dream showed that the patient, who was 
attached to his mother by an infantile fixation, was here realizing sexual intercourse displaced 
‘from below upwards’ […], in which the left hand represented the masculine, the mouth the 
feminine genital, while the right, and so to say more decent, hand was at the service of the 
stirring defense tendencies and wanted to chase away the criminal ‘mouse’ (Ferenczi 1950a 
[1918]: 111–112).
Let me first detach Ferenczi’s interpretation of the case and of hysteria in general from 
this account.  What we have is not a simple symptom of hysterical anesthesia, but a complex 
scene – or two scenes – with a well-structured narrative.  In the first act we can see three 
actors: the mouse, the mouth and the right hand.  In the second act there are only two 
persons on stage: the mother and the son.  The two stories are the following: /1/ a mouse 
wants to get into a hole (the mouth), but an outer power (the right hand) tries to prevent it, 
/2/ the son succeeds in calming down by getting into his mother’s bed.  It is not hard to see 
the structural similarities and differences of the two acts.  Both of them have the same 
content, though the hindering factor is (manifestly) absent in the second act.  Without 
identifying this content, I will offer irregular interpolations for the acts one after the other, 
in order to recognize the actors and their referential statuses.
Let’s see the stage in the first act, the stage which is now the human body itself, the body 
of the son and/or husband.  The actors on this stage are also the parts of this very body; two 
of them perform themselves, the third one plays the role of a mouse, it slips into the skin of 
a foreign being.  This structure, that is, to slip the part of the body into the skin of a foreign 
creature, and play its role this way, is the structure of puppetry.  At first sight, however, this 
puppetry appears to be incomplete, because of the mouth and the right hand being 
themselves.  But is this the case indeed?  I shall try to find the answer by dividing the scene 
between “foreign” and “own” elements of the self.  In other words, the question is whether 
the meaning of the left hand is a mouse, and the meaning of the right hand and the mouth a 
hand and a mouth?
The only foreign element of the scene seems to be the mouse, which could not be 
recognized by the young man as his own body part.  What is surprising to me, is not the left 
hand’s being a mouse, but the fact, that the other hand which wants to “catch or chase away” 
this mouse is a hand, and the mouth which the mouse wants to burgle or shelter into 
performs as a mouth.  So, in respect of the events, the puppetry’s first completing 
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interpolation might be putting a cat and a mouse-hole (as implied representations of the 
mouse-representation in such situations) on stage, which are both in some sense the young 
man’s own.  But the actual cast of the play was not this.  The question why will be clear 
from the second act, which can be legitimately understood as solving the first one.  It also 
accounts for the ambivalence manifest in our narrative’s hesitation between to “catch or 
chase away,” something that I suggest interpreting in relation to the mouth-hole being 
foreign or own.
The first comment on the second act, as was mentioned before, is that it apparently has 
two actors, and its dénouement is the opposite to that of the first one.  If we accept that the 
actors can be equated in some way – since otherwise the second act would hardly serve to 
diminish the anxiety in the first one – then the mouse univocally belongs to the son and the 
mouth to the mother’s bed.  This also imlies that the mouth did not mean itself in the first 
scene, but referred to the mother’s bed, and via that to the mother herself.  The ambivalence 
of the mouse/mouth-hole manifest in the binarisms of “catching – chasing away” and 
burgling – sheltering becomes interpretable now.  The hole is something own and foreign at 
the same time.  The key is the double binarism of the initial triad: the polarity of the own 
(right) hand and the foreign (left) hand (the mouse), and the polarity of the hands – both the 
foreign and the own – as hands and the mouth, the foreign/own.  The inner binarisms of the 
triad result from the double role of the young man in the story, he is a husband and a son. 
So, there is a close relation between the left hand and the right hand, and there is a close 
relation between the left hand and the mouth, but the right hand and the mouth owe their 
relationship only to the left hand, which slips into a foreign skin to make this relation 
realized.  In the whole story these binarisms constitute a series: two women (the mother and 
the wife), two neighboring rooms (the room of the mother and the room of the young 
couple) and the two hands on one side; and the hand and the mouth, the son and the bed and 
the cat and the hole on the other side.  I suggest (and this is my second interpolation), that 
the missing third actor of the second act, that is the hindering factor of the first act is the 
wife, or the meaning she represents.  In my interpretation the wife (representation) is the 
repressed and at the same time repressing element, which makes the right hand strangle the 
stifling left hand, producing in this way an intricate interplay of pressures and repressions. 
The resulting confusion (causing a sensation of anxiety) is a confusion of the body image 
on the first level, a delusive image of the body, but actually it is, as we will see, a confusion 
of language as well.
If we search for the director of this puppetry, we will find the Id, or, in Ferenczi’s term, 
the “biological unconscious.”  It is responsible for such an inversion of the own-foreign 
binarism, that is the only part of the body which represents something own (the phallus or 
the whole of the young man) which has to slip into another skin, and it lets the other parts, 
which refer to something foreign (the representations of the mother and that of the wife) 
remain themselves on the surface as parts of the own body.  What happens, is the 
displacement of the libido to the left hand in order to make foreign the own (wish) and 
change the foreign (objects of the wish) into own.  The left hand becomes a signifier of the 
mouse from a signified (as something equal with the young man on the basis of partiality) 
by means of cathexis.  In the scene, the other two actors do not slip out of their skin, they 
– as signifiers – seem to signify themselves: a hand tries to catch or chase away a mouse 
from the mouth.  As if the signified would be the hand and the mouth as well, as if there 
would be no symbolization, if not that of a mouse, of a cat and of a hole.  This delusive 
substitution of the signifier with the signified is familiar for us from the phenomenon of 
mimicry in biology: I mean the case when a part of the body mimics another being, turning 
itself as signified into the signifier of something else, which, while signifying this part of the 
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body, behaves in the same way as the being signified by this part of the body.  I think that 
the displacement of the libido, often mentioned in relation to hysteria, serves the same goal 
of making this delusion possible, the substitution of signifying elements of language for 
signified ones, and vice versa.
Puppet Show at Work
Paraphrasing the thesis that each work of art tells us what art is, we may say that each case 
of hysteria tells us what hysteria is.  Ferenczi gives the following explanation for the 
mechanism of hysteria: a too strong quiver of instinct strives to get into the conscious, the 
ego represses it into the unconscious, but since this repression is unsuccessful, the repression 
goes on to the level of motility.  There it can produce meaningful materializations, for it has 
touched the contents of consciousness.  The cited case of hysterical anesthesia performs this 
mechanism on another level of interpretation as well.  The over-determination of the 
psychical allows us to look deeper into the confusion of the language of repression, the 
representations of strangling and suffocating.  Therefore my third interpolation is the 
following: in the scene the right (foreign) hand strangles the left (own) hand in order to save 
the mouth from being blocked.  The wish represented by the left hand had to be estranged 
just because of its very own nature, it had to be repressed in order not to steal into the 
conscious (the mouth).  The repression is made by the right hand, that is, by right, which is 
the foreign element put into the ego (super-ego).  In our case this power is the separated but 
living presence of the wife.  The withdrawal of the libido from the right hand and the mouth, 
that is the apparent withdrawal of the role of signifiers from them, makes the libidinization 
of the left hand possible, that is presenting it as a mouse signified.
Ferenczi was also aware of this play between own and foreign, signified and signifier.  In 
another study he writes the following:
The stomach and the bowel play puppet-games with their own walls and contents, instead of 
digesting and excreting their contents; the skin is no longer the protecting cover of the body 
which by its sensitiveness gives warning of unusual impressions; it behaves like a genuine 
sexual organ, contact with which is, of course, not consciously perceived but unconsciously 
provides gratification.  The musculature, instead of as usual assisting in the maintenance of life 
by purposively co-ordinated activities, exhausts itself in dramatic representations of the 
pleasurable situations of phantasy.  And there is no organ nor any part of the body that is proof 
against being employed for such pleasure purposes. […] Presumably, however, these pleasure-
trends of the bodily organs do not cease entirely by day, and it would require a special 
‘physiology of pleasure’ to understand their entire significance.  Hitherto the science of vital 
processes has been exclusively a physiology of utility, and has been concerned only with the 
functions of organs that are of utility in the preservation of life (Ferenczi 1950b [1918]: l03).
This theme, the changing of functions or “roles” of organs, is placed on the agenda 
throughout Ferenczi’s work, along with his thesis that conversion, “the mysterious leap 
from the mental to the physical” (Freud) is not simply identical with the turning of the 
psychical into something physical.  Ferenczi believes it also means the turning of ego-
functions into erotic functions.  Some years after the passage cited Ferenczi returned to the 
problem in one of his masterpieces, Thalassa:
If there were no such separation of pleasure activities, the eye would be absorbed in erotic 
looking, the mouth would be exclusively utilized as an oral-erotic instrument, instead of being 
employed in necessary self-preservative activities; even the skin would not be the protective 
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covering whose sensitiveness provides warning of danger, but would be merely the seat of 
erotic sensations; the musculature would not be the executive instrument of purposive volitional 
activity, but would subserve only the release of sadistic and other pleasurable motor discharges, 
etc. (Ferenczi 1968 [1929]: 16).
This work is intended to be an expounding of the pleasure physiology, with special 
respect to the genital organs, since it is in their case that the fruitlessness of traditional 
physiology is most apparent.  Ferenczi, however, is not only concerned with these particular 
individual organs, but rather with the cooperation of organs in general.
Each organ possesses a certain ‘individuality;’ in each and every organ there is repeated that 
conflict between ego- and libidinal interests which, too, we have encountered hitherto only in 
the analysis of psychic individualities.  It is physiology in particular which seems hitherto to 
have underestimated the significance of libidinal energies in both the normal and the 
pathological functioning of organs, so that, even if only a part of the assumptions in connection 
with our theory of genitality prove sound, the physiology and pathology of use which has 
prevailed up to the present needs supplementing by a physiology of pleasure (Ferenczi 1968 
[1929]: 82–83).
The key words in this passage are conflict and division.  The pattern – and the starting 
point as well – is the psychic conflict, being repressed to the level of physical-organic 
functioning, materializes itself in the form of a certain symptom according to the mechanism 
of hysterical conversion.  However, what Ferenczi speaks about here is mainly the conflict 
of egoistic and cooperative interests occuring in an organ independently from the psyche as 
the cause of organic diseases.  In respect to the given organ, we can speak about the 
disintegration of the division of labor and of cooperation in both cases; the division of labor 
can not exist without the sharing of pleasure.  Each organ must get its own satisfaction of 
pleasure-needs (or wishes), but it must get it in such a manner, that the cooperation with the 
other organs does not suffer from this.
The organs carry on their utility functioning only so long as the organism as a whole provides 
also for the gratification of their libido.  […] If this ceases, the tendency towards self-
gratification on the part of the individual organs may be revived, to the detriment of their 
cooperative functioning as parts of a whole – much as an ill-treated child has recourse to self-
gratification (Compare the abandoning of utility functioning in hysterical blindness – Freud) 
(Ferenczi 1968 [1929]: 86).
From these quotations it is obvious that there is a close relation between the inner conflict 
of an organ and the conflict between the organs of an organism: an intra-organic conflict 
causes inter-organic conflicts and vice versa.  But behind this not too original statement, 
there is the effort to harmonize the Lamarckian adaptation-theory and the struggle-
conception of Darwinism.
Bioanalysis learned from the psychoanalytic study of hysteria that the mental power of the wish 
is operative in the organic sphere also, that a wish may become ‘materialized’ in the body and 
may remould the body in accordance with a program of its own.  We have no reason for 
disbelieving that such wishful strivings operate also outside the psychic and therefore in the 
biological unconscious; indeed, we are inclined to feel, and may boast of being in accord with 
Freud therein, that the adjutant role played by the wish as a factor in evolution makes the 
Lamarckian theory of adaptation for the first time intelligible (Ferenczi 1968 [1929]: 90–91).
It is not accidental that in l932, when Ferenczi reverts to this theme, and exactly in 
relation to this very book, his attention focuses on the problem of adaptation and its 
relationship to erotics:
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…purely egoistic (utility) functions (breathing, heartbeat) would be nonerotic.  Organs currently 
engaged in the process of adapting themselves (the most recent products of development) are 
erotic.  Hysteria is the regression of eroticism into organs that otherwise only serve ego 
functions; the physical diseases of organs do the same.  […] The point at which external 
(alloplastic) control is completely abandoned and inner adaptation sets in (whereby reconciliation 
even with the destruction of the ego, that is, death as a form of adaptation, becomes conceivable) 
will be perceived inwardly as deliverance (?), liberation.  This moment probably signifies the 
relinquishing of self-preservation for man and his self-inclusion (Sich-einordnen) in a greater, 
perhaps universal state of equilibrium (Ferenczi l988: 4, 7).
As we see, in the case of pleasure-deprivation, the organism – or the biological uncon-
scious – begins to think.  This not only implies that the biological unconscious is intelligent, 
but thinking is erotic or needs erotics in itself (cp. Hárs 1996).  The cited passage from the 
Diary of Ferenczi seems to be a return to his idea in 1903 (or proves the continuity of his 
thinking?), when he was not yet affiliated with psychoanalysis: “the instinct of man is 
thinking, the thinking of lower creatures is instinct” (Ferenczi 1996 [1903]: 156).  But in the 
light of psychoanalysis, we can also recognize the eroticism of the death-instinct, suggested 
already in Thalassa.  Thus we have puppetry at complete work in the triad of eroticism, 
death and intelligence.  Our director, the biological unconscious is already able to make 
puppets (empty bodies) from us or parts of us, which has nothing, or nothing “own” inside. 
It can make a signifier from the signified.  The show goes on as Ferenczi demonstrated both 
in onto-genesis and phylo-genesis, and, I strive to argue, in civilization as well.
“An Ill-treated Child” – One Play, Two Performances
The script of the play, a version of which we have just seen, and which may be called 
hysteria, has an official history and several private ones.  Among the private histories there 
are those of eminent importance, which have influenced the history of both hysteria and 
psychoanalysis.  The history of hysteria in the performance of Ferenczi is of this kind.
There is a parallel between Ferenczi’s theory concerning the disappearance of hysteria in 
relation to the growth of diseases into more civilized ones, and his striving to make Freud 
(his authority) disappear.  Let us see some passages concerning Freud and hysteria in 
chronological order.
1. The birth of psychoanalysis.
A genial patient and her understanding physician shared in the discovery of the forerunner of 
psycho-analysis, namely, the cathartic treatment of hysteria (Ferenczi 1950c [1930]: 109).
It should not be forgotten that Freud is not the discoverer of analysis but that he took over 
something ready-made, from Breuer.  Perhaps he followed Breuer merely in a logical, 
intellectual fashion, and not with any emotional conviction; consequently he only analyzes 
others but not himself.  Projection (Ferenczi l988: 92).
We must not forget, that both citations are from the thirties, at the time of Ferenczi’s open 
return to the trauma-conception of the early Freud as opposed to the thinking of the old 
Freud, whose importance and influence Ferenczi deemed it necessary to reduce on behalf of 
the development of psychoanalysis itself.  In a way, what Ferenczi brings into question is the 
psychiatrist Freud’s competence to deal with hysteria.  It is this incompetence and some 
additional reasons (besides the ones concerning the origin of psychoanalysis) that are the 
theme of the passage touching the next stage of the history of hysteria in Ferenczi’s theory.
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2. The early Freud and the crisis.
I tend to think that originally Freud really did believe in analysis; he followed Breuer with 
enthusiasm and worked passionately, devotedly, on the curing of neurotics (if necessary 
spending hours lying on the floor next to a person in hysterical crisis).  He must have been first 
shaken and then disenchanted, however, by certain experiences, rather like Breuer when his 
patient had a relapse and when the problem of countertransference opened up before him like an 
abyss.  This may well correspond in Freud’s case to the discovery that hysterics lie.  Since 
making this discovery Freud no longer loves his patients.  He has returned to the love of his 
well-ordered and cultivated superego (a further proof of this being his antipathy toward and 
deprecating remarks about psychotics, perverts, and everything in general that is ‘too abnormal,’ 
even against Indian mythology).  Since this shock, this disillusionment, there is much less talk 
of trauma, the constitution now begins to play the principal role.  Of course this involves a 
certain amount of fatalism.  After the psychological wave, Freud has thus landed, first, in the 
materialism of the natural scientist again.  He sees almost nothing in the subjective, except the 
superstructure of the physical; the physical itself is something much more real.  Secondly, he still 
remains attached to analysis intellectually, but not emotionally.  And third, his therapeutic 
method, like his theory, is becoming more and more /influenced/ by his interest in order, 
character, the replacement of a bad superego by a better one; he is becoming pedagogical.  The 
modification of his therapeutic method, becoming more and more impersonal (levitating like 
some kind of divinity above the poor patient, reduced to the status of a mere child, not suspecting 
that a large share of what is described as transference is artificially provoked by this kind of 
behaviour), one postulates that transference is created by the patient) (Ferenczi l988: 93).
While first we have seen Ferenczi’s criticism of Freud’s relation to the origins of 
psychoanalysis as deriving from the study of hysteria, here he is speaking about Freud’s 
relation to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis and to hysterics as well.  In the third 
step we see how Ferenczi regards Freud’s relationship to the psychoanalytical organization 
and to himself, and how Ferenczi views the personal relationship of Freud to hysteria itself.
3. After the period of crisis and solitude.
In the case of F/erenczi/ it appears that Fr/eud/ altered the external situation to conform to the 
neurotic wish of the patient, in order to escape something traumatic.  (a) Contrary to all the rules 
of technique that he established himself, he adopted Dr.  F/erenczi/ almost like his son.  As he 
himself told me, he regarded him as the most perfect heir of his ideas.  Thereby he became the 
proclaimed crown prince, anticipating his triumphal entry into America.  (Fr/eud/ seems to have 
expected something similar of Jung years ago; hence the two hysterical symptoms, I observed 
in him): (1) the fainting spell in Bremen, (2) the incontinence on Riverside Drive […].  The 
advantages of following blindly were: (l) membership in a distinguished group guaranteed by 
the king, indeed with the rank of field marshal for myself (crown-prince phantasy).  […] The 
dishonesty of reserving the technique for one’s own person; the advice not to let the patients 
learn anything about the technique and finally the pessimistic view […] that neurotics are a 
rabble, good only to support us financially and to allow us to learn from their cases: 
psychoanalysis as a therapy may be worthless.  This was the point where I refused to follow him 
(Ferenczi l988: 184–186).
From this we get a picture of Freud’s competence regarding hysteria in Ferenczi’s mind. 
First, the psychoanalytical conception and the connecting treatment is neither the discovery, 
nor the property of Freud.  Second, Freud himself is hysterical or at least produces hysterical 
symptoms, which implies a different kind of competence.  This is also affirmed by Jones, 
who albeit is very far from Ferenczi regarding his personality, way of thinking, and emotions 
as well (Jones 1973: 270, 470).  Third, for this reason, Freud disliked hysterics, and finally, 
misunderstood the treatment and the etiology (trauma).  As we see, we meet the ancient 
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paradox: the hysterical Freud says that hysterics are liars.  It suggests Bion’s question about 
the possibility of analyzing a liar (Bion 1977).  I suggest that here the symptom is not the act 
of lying in itself, but the paradox it produces.  The necessity of “lying that hysterics are lying” 
is justified by the problem of sexual trauma in the early childhood.  For if the story – and 
hence the thesis – of sexual insults is true, then Freud himself also suffered from such an 
insult and trauma.  How to understand in this case his statement concerning the uselessness 
of the analytical treatment? But if hysterics are really liars, then neither Freud, nor anyone 
else endured these insults – if only in fantasy.  As we see, in the first case there may be a 
trauma, but it is senseless to detect it because of the uselessness of the available technics.  In 
the second case there is no trauma at all, so there is no reason to search for it.  This successful 
double defense, which was manifest in the paradox, was experienced by Freud as provoked 
by the mutual analysis theory of Ferenczi, which he had to reject.  For what happens, if 
techniques (psychoanalysis) do work after all and the analyzing patient gets an insight not 
into the lies of the analyst, but in the real story of the analyst’s psyche?
Let us stop here and turn back to Ferenczi’s theory of hysteria.  As we have seen, he 
conceived hysteria in terms of the conflict of egoistic and cooperative interests, with the 
termination of the division of labor (or the division of “roles”), and of the sharing of 
pleasure.  In the case of hysteria, the original conflict arises in the psyche, this is repressed 
by displacement to the physical-organic level and manifests itself in material symptoms. 
Ferenczi gives us a very expressive illustration of the mentioned termination of dividing and 
sharing, as it produces the libidization of ego-functions; or of their serving erotic functions, 
that is in our example “auto-eroticism:” the child treated badly.  The analogy between the 
sulky organ and the offended child is more than a mere model for us with the knowledge of 
the Freud–Ferenczi relationship.  Our suspicion can be affirmed by the interpersonal nature 
of this example.  What organism is to the organ, so is family to the child.  The personal 
concerns of auto-eroticism can be justified from the Clinical Diary.  Thus I suggest taking 
this analogy seriously from both directions, as a slip of the tongue of the “enfant terrible” 
of psychoanalysis.
Imagine therefore Freud as the head of a large (public) body.  Other parts of this body are 
working under the control and with the agreement of the head.  There is a controlled 
cooperation and division of labor (of functions) in the body, each part does its own work, 
each has its own function contributing to the sustenance of the whole body.  Thus each of 
them gives up its independence to some extent.  In exchange they are sharing pleasure, their 
libidinal (narcissistic) aims are satisfied, they get love from other parts of the body and share 
the common identity (to be a psychoanalyst, a part of the psychoanalytical organization) with 
all of the advantages of this, like popularity, defense, or aid, for instance.  There is an inner 
conflict, however, in the head of the body – just in relation to hysteria.  As we know from 
psychoanalysis, a wish or even a thought which is unpleasant or unacceptable for the 
consciousness, thus causing conflict, must be repressed to the unconscious.  It was precisely 
this mechanism that appeared in the form of a paradox in the case of Freud’s early hysteria 
conception.  However, the repression was not enough, as the repressed idea had met with the 
efforts of another part of the psychoanalytical body producing a kind of provocation of the 
head: “I refused to follow him.”  From then on, the conflict was not an inner conflict in the 
head, but a conflict between two parts of a body.  This conflict can be analyzed as a double 
conflict of ego- and libidinal interests in the whole body.  The ego-interest is the interest of 
psychoanalysis itself both in the head and the other part, but is conceived in different ways. 
The head’s interest is to maintain the status quo as a defense against becoming conscious of 
its inner conflict.  From this point of view the interest of psychoanalysis means the head’s 
own interest.  The ego-interest of the other part is to assert the interest of psychoanalysis, 
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even if it is in contradiction with the interest of the head.  So, its interest is that of 
psychoanalysis.  Hence the provocation: to make the head’s inner conflict become conscious 
within the body.  The ego-interests tell the head, that the other part fights and thus becomes 
destructive, while the other part assumes, that the head lies, thus destroys.  The inner conflict 
of ego- and libidinal interests in the head, which has been already mentioned, results in either 
giving up truth on his personal behalf or handing himself over on behalf of theory.  Similarly, 
the inner conflict of the other part (caused by the conflict of the head) is to follow the head 
and preserve the love of the body, or to lose this love on behalf of scientific truth.  The 
decision in favor of the second solution causes the conflict of libidinal interests, the head 
experiences the other part as a rebel, the other part experiences the head as being jealous of 
it.  What happens at this point according to our theory of hysteria?
As we know, when repression proves to be unsuccessful, it transfers to the organic-
materialistic level, where symptom-formation takes place.  This transference of the conflict 
alienates something from the own body, an outer part from the other part, which is perceived 
as confronting the body as a whole, as if it were something ill.  This is precisely what 
happened in the case of Freud and Ferenczi.  Ferenczi’s theories about hysteria and trauma 
were qualified as symptoms of auto-eroticism, endangering the cooperation, the division of 
labor in the learned body.  But this auto-eroticism was the result of a deprivation of love, 
the result of the transference of the given inner conflict, which changed the living body into 
a dead corpora(tion).  Psychoanalysis till then signified all parts of the body, including 
Ferenczi, too.  We may assume however that Ferenczi was not satisfied any longer to be a 
signified, but he wanted to signify himself, something foreign to the existing psychoanalysis. 
He was the part of a body namely, but he became a part of a corpora(tion) as well.  Slipping 
into “foreignness,” the puppetry might start.
I was brave (and productive) only as long as I (unconsciously) relied for support on another 
power, that is, I had never really become ‘grown-up.’  Scientific achievements, marriage, battles 
with formidable colleagues – all this was possible only under the protection of the idea that in 
all circumstances I can count on the father-surrogate.  […] I have just received a few personally 
friendly lines from Jones.  (He has sent roses, suggested a circular letter.) Cannot deny that I 
was pleasantly touched even by this.  I indeed also feel abandoned by colleagues (Radó etc.) 
who are all too afraid of Freud to behave objectively or even sympathetically towards me, in 
the case of a dispute between Freud and me.  A more restrained circulation of letters between 
Freud, Jones, and Eitington has certainly been going on for a long time now.  I am treated like 
a sick person, who must be spared.  My intervention will have to wait until I recover, so that the 
special ‘care’ becomes unnecessary (Ferenczi l988: 212–213).
The citation is from Ferenczi’s last note in his Diary.  It informs us about the fact, that 
the transference of the conflict inside the body as a whole makes the signified becoming the 
signifier perceived as a disease, as the illness of the signified.  It seems, that the fate of 
Ferenczi reaffirmed his theory of hysteria: “with the advance of civilization, even the 
neuroses have become more civilized and adult.  But I believe, that, if we are sufficiently 
patient and persevering, even firmly consolidated, purely intrapsychic mechanisms can be 
demolished and reduced to the level of the infantile trauma” (Ferenczi 1950d [1931]: 141).
Organization Eroticized – From Body to Corpora(tion)
It is customary to speak about the similarity between an organism and an organization in 
two senses, from a horizontal (synchronic) aspect and from a vertical (diachronic) one.  The 
life of an organization is comparable to the life of an organism, where the notions of the life 
 
replika134
periods of the organization (birth, childhood, puberty, youth, adulthood, old age and death) 
are taken over from the field of the organism.  This comparison is very attractive in its 
generality, but at the same time it is odious.  The “biology” of groups is not the same as the 
biology of a single being.  Organizations are capable of rebirth, while the human organism 
ends with the act of death.  If we take rebirth into account, it is better to point out the 
similarity between the mental ages of a person and that of an organization.  In terms of the 
other, horizontal-synchronic approach, there is a similarity between the parts or organs of 
an organism and the members of an organization.  It is a functional similarity based upon 
the idea of cooperation and the division of labor.  According to this conception, the members 
or groups of members in an organization are functioning as eye-man, brain-man, heart-man, 
or foot-man, for instance, in order to sustain the totality.  This organizational anatomy or 
physiology reminds us of the “utilitarian physiology” of Ferenczi, and raises the same 
problem as an explanatory image: it can do nothing with the libidinal interest, the wish, the 
desire, thus with the pathology of non-organic, functional diseases.
I suggest a psychoanalytical approach instead of the former ones, or in order to complete 
them.  I do not want, however, to equate the personal psyche with the psychical functioning 
of an organization, that is, to reduce social psychology to the psychology of an individual. 
I rather strive to argue, that there is not only a causal (psychical) interrelationship between 
an organization and a member of it, but there is a psychical permeability between them, 
even in respect of pathology.  I think that what we have seen happening in the 
psychoanalytical organization is not a unique case, but an example of one way of functioning 
or – more exactly – of dysfunctioning.  The dysfunction of an organization does not 
necessary mean disease in the literal sense of the word.  The pathology of organizations, 
which has been missing from the study of them, must deal with diseases, and not with 
metaphors.
Even Bion, whose ideas seem to be very close to this conception of organization 
eroticized, that is, to the shift from body to corpora(tion), thinks about physical and mental 
illness only as something embodying the notion of an outer or inner enemy (the content of 
the “fight-flight basic assumption”), the fight against which (“to defend or escape”) serves 
the group’s aim to satisfy its hidden goals and desires.  Bion classifies the relations between 
the “mystic-genius” and the group in terms of biology.  He speaks about commensual, 
symbiotic and parasitic relations (Grinberg, Sor, and Bianchedi l975).  These terms, 
however, refer to the world of reactions and not to the world of representations.  This is one 
way of describing what happens on the level of ego-functions (the “work group”) and on 
the level of libidinal ones (the “basic assumption group”).  But the example of the 
psychoanalytical organization has shown us the very case, when the leader of a group 
handles this group as his own body, as an extension of himself.  This means, that there are 
no reactions from other members who are external to him (who are not parts of a single 
body), but there is a symptom-formation on an own part of him which does not react, but 
represents something inner.  What happens is not the parallel working of ego-functions 
(“work group”) and libidinal functions (“basic assumption group”), but the act of 
libidization, that is the ego-functions’ turning into erotic ones on behalf of delusion – the 
self-delusion of the leader himself.  The mechanism, as we have seen, is to make foreign the 
own, to make signifier from signified.  The part (person) suffering from this change 
becomes the representation of a hidden narrative embodying the results of the confusion of 
body image, that is the confusion of language.  Sometimes this confusion is the symptom 
of, and at the same time, the beginning of the agony of the organization – of living body’s 
turning into dead corpora(tion).
If we read again Ferenczi’s passage about mental diseases’ becoming more civilized and 
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more adult during the process of civilization, we can offer two different interpretations of 
it.  It can mean that certain diseases are changed by other ones, which are more suitable for 
the given age, more up-to-date, more adequate in the light of new problems.  It can also 
mean, however, that the existing diseases find new, more civilized and adult – that is 
institutionalized – forms, as not only conscious phenomena become more and more 
organized, but unconscious ones as well.  This can be perhaps an answer to our question 
about the disappearance of hysteria.  It has found a new form in which its structure can 
continue to function.
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